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INTRODUCTION
"Visions ofRationality"-the topic of this Symposium-pervade evidence
scholarship and rule of law principles. The rule of law is often described as
a search for truth in a system that aspires to rationality.' The question begged,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen
School of Law.
I. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force ofLegal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 929 (1996) (explaining that the
"normative order constituted by the legal system, informed by 'rule of law' principles as well
as by many others, aspires to be rational in significant ways"). Asserting truth and rationality
goals tends to make people nervous in a postmodern world, where people doubt the
achievability of truth, where many believe truth is contextual and different perspectives on truth
abound. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 150 (1996) (characterizing
postmodernism as emphasizing the idea that "no practice or discourse enjoys a privileged
position vis-a-vis others" and asserting that "truth in law is a matter of the forms of legal
argument"). Some postmodem scholars ditch the concept of law as a search for truth entirely,
seeing it rather as a contest for power. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 13 (1996)
(arguing that the adversary system is not a search for truth but a contest, the goal of which is to
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of course, is what is rationality? In attempting to answer this question, this
essay explores rationality, both in terms of how people think-the domain of
cognitive psychology-and in terms of what goals people are attempting to
achieve. Truth and rationality have a purpose: they are harnessed to the rule
of law as a vital safeguard from the paradox of freedom in democracies, in
which (if not restrained) the strong-physically or economically-defeat the
freedom that enabled them by preying on the weak.2 Thus, the rationality that
concerns evidence scholars is the way in which legal process and the thought
processes of legal decisionmakers interact.
One of the key features of legal process-at least in the United States-is
the jury.3 Although the jury system, which provides a structure for citizen
participation and brings the voice of the community into the process of legal
decisionmaking,4 and is integral to the separation of powers doctrine'--the
bifurcation of decisionmaking duties between judge and jury has
consequences. One of the primary consequences of the jury system is the
restriction on the information that the jury will be able to use for its
win). However, this article argues that just because our attempts to discover the truth may be
only relatively successful, just because we may have different perspectives on what is truth does
not mean that the search should be abandoned, or that the effort to improve the process is
unavailing. For an amusing and enlightening explanation of why both visions (law as truth
search and law as contest) may be correct, see Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989,
1003 (1978) (acknowledging that although the adversary system "does seem more or less well
adapted to providing the more or less accurate data needed for the rational operation of the
[system and is] ... largely capable of answering the question 'what happened' at the legally
relevant time" there are important ways in which it is also a contest).
2. See K. R. POPPER, 2 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 124 (5th ed., rev. 1966)
(discussing the paradox of freedom); WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OFEVIDENCE: BENTHAMAND
WIGMORE 90 (1985) (explaining the truth theory of adjudication as the foundation of good
government and remarking that "justice absolutely depends upon it").
3. See RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 6-7 (1980)
(describing the role of popular participation in the administration ofjustice).
4. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment,
57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653-56, 654 n.47 (1973) (discussing the British circumvention of the
colonists' right to trial by jury as a significant cause of the American revolution).
5. See generally id., at 653-71 (discussing the jury as a popular check on the three
branches of government). Even federal judges, with their life tenure, are subject to political
pressure, a point that worried the framers and was a subject of discussion during the ratification
debates. See id. at 695-96. The jury was expected to restore community values to what might
otherwise become arbitrary decisionmaking. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3-16 (197 1) (discussing the function ofthejury as a bulwark against
tyranny).
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determination.6 The idea that some evidence should be kept from the jury
because it is irrelevant, unhelpful, confusing, a waste of time, or unduly
prejudicial, is seen by some as unfairly maligning the jury.7
One especially rancourous area has been the use of expert witnesses and
the necessity of judicial screening for validity before permitting experts to
testify. After the Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy of cases,' the question for
admissibility of scientific evidence now is whether the testimony has met the
standards and methods of science.9 Even in state courts that have eschewed
the Daubert standard in favor of the old general acceptance rule, there is an
increased concern with scientific validity. In earlier articles," I addressed
whether judges were equipped to evaluate the validity of experts,
and-concluding that they could-offered a framework for undertaking the
enterprise." In this essay, I would like to suggest some reasons why the judge
is the appropriate decisionmaker, and why, from a cognitive standpoint, it is
important to the goal of rationality that the judge perform this screening
function.
This is no denigration of the jury. The judge should perform this
function not because judges are innately more thoughtful or responsible than
jurors, but because a structured inquiry into scientific validity for which they
will be held accountable forces judges to engage in what Professor Gregory
Mitchell refers to as "active, open-minded thinking."'" A basic insight of the
6. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, MinimizingtheJury Over- Valuation Concern, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 967 (noting that "we are told that although an item of evidence is
probative, it must be excluded because thejury will give it too much weight" and searching for
"other grounds for exclusion" although noting that "in some other settings we might instead
decide that the best result is admission of the evidence" ).
7. See id. at 969-71 (arguing that fear of jury over-valuation of evidence is
unwarranted).
8. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiringjudicial
gatekeeping for scientific validity); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the validity inquiry to technical as well as
scientific evidence).
9. See generally ARTHUR FINE, THE SHAKY GAME: EINSTEIN, REALISM, AND THE
QUANTUM THEORY (1986) (asserting that questions about the truth claims of science must be
answered by reference to the methods and standards of science).
10. See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray ofLight for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of
Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1051 (1999).
11. See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics ofIntellectual Due Process: A Primerfor
Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1563, 1589 (2000).
12. See Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1116,
1116-17 n. 105 (defining active open-minded thinking as "willingness to consider new evidence
and opposing arguments before reaching a conclusion" specifically consisting of"( 1) search that
is thorough in proportion to the importance of the question, (2) confidence that is appropriate
to the amount and quality of thinking done, and (3) fairness to other possibilities than the one
2003]
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common law system is that a structured reasoning process improves
judgment. 3 Thus, in allocating the decision process between judge and jury,
methodologies (such as the rules of evidence) should be employed in order-as
much as possible-to implement rule of law principles-a notion of due
process.'4 The aspiration to truth and rationality reflects a concern for
accurate evidentiary input: in order to reach a justifiable decision, reasoning
must be based on trustworthy information. 5 A third consequence of the
aspiration to rationality is that even trustworthy facts must have some logical
tendency to prove or disprove an issue in the case.' 6
This framework for justice is the inspiration for the rules of evidence,
and a fundamental tenet is that only facts having relevance-rational probative
we initially favor") (citing JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 191-92 (3d ed. 2000)).
13. This insight has been borne out by the research of cognitive psychologists. See,
e.g., Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution
Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388 (1989).
14. In other words, there should be "a process reasonably designed to ascertain the
truth." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (rev. 1999) (1971). See also WILLIAM
TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 107 (Northwestern Univ. Press 1990) (discussing the
rationalist tradition in evidence scholarship and its main epistemological assumption that the
purpose of adjudication is to discover an objectively knowable truth, while at the same time
acknowledging that "the notion of 'fact' in adjudication is more problematic than the orthodox
view suggests.... Thus it is misleading to suggest that legal enquiries into questions of fact are
value-free") (footnotes omitted). Even law and economics adheres to the notion of legal process
as a search for truth. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). Posner states judicial error is "a
source of social costs and the reduction of error is a goal of the procedural system." 1d. at 401.
That is why, Posner explains, a procedural rule such as the constitutional exclusionary rule "is
exceptional, and is recognized-and often bitterly criticized-as such." Id.
15. The belief that decisions based on correct information come closer to the truth is
the basis of normative epistemology, including "norms governing how individuals should
acquire and weigh evidence as well as, ultimately, form beliefs." Ronald J. Allen & Brian
Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1498 (200 1)
(contending that the rules of evidence "structure the epistemic process by which jurors arrive
at beliefs about disputed matters of fact at trials").
16. Sometimes this concept is called "materiality," and it is considered to be one of the
generative principles of the law of evidence. See Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of
Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69, 70 (2001) (noting that the generative principle of
materiality, now subsumed under the relevance requirement, permits into evidence only that
evidence that is "'of consequence' to the legitimate determination of the action").
[Vol. 4:987990
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value-should be admissible in the search for truth. 7 The common law's
long-standing requirement is that judges act as gatekeepers, screening
irrelevant information from the jury and explaining the basis of their reasoning
and that the basis be well-founded. This is the cornerstone of a system that
aspires to rationality." Although the meanings of truth and rationality are
subject to debate in an open society, ultimately truth is empirical, and what we
understand as rationality consists of a structured reasoning process relating
perception to an explanation about how the world works.' 9 This requires
accurate information, and justifiable inferences.20 In sum, the reason we need
gatekeepers is to ensure that the statements offered into evidence comport
with permissible legal theories, embedded as they are in cultural systems of
belief, assumptions and claims about the world.2' Although what we seek to
17. The doctrines of relevance and probativity are expressed as follows under the
federal rules of evidence: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. And: "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading thejury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID.
403. A corollary is that all facts that have rational probative value should be admissible unless
forbidden under a competing concern of the justice system (stating an example may be the
improper use of state power implicated in the exclusionary rule). See TWINING, supra note 14,
at 152. But see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins ofthe Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 82 (1995) (contending that evidence law grew out of the
adversarial system as part of the "Sixth Amendment rights that affirmatively grant an accused
the opportunity for meaningful defense advocacy").
18. See Brewer, supra note I, at 929 (exploring the rational force of reasoning from
precedent, given that the "normative order constituted by the legal system, informed by 'rule of
law' principles as well as by many others, aspires to be rational in significant ways").
19. See WILLARD V. QUINE, THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH 19 (1990) (describing rationality
as a structured reasoning process relating sensory input to a web of theoretical output). Quine
asserts that science is rational, as opposed to metaphysics, religion or astrology, because all
questions are ultimately questions of empirical fact and science answers these questions more
successfully. See id. For an elegant exposition of Quine's philosophy, see Brian Leiter, Why
Quine Is Not a Postmodernist, 50 SMU L. REV. 1739 (1997).
20. In terms of the reasoning process, Quine does not see that there is anything special
about scientific logic; it is just like common sense, only more careful. See W. V. QUINE, The
Scope and Language of Science, in THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS 228, 233
(1976) ("The scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in his sense of evidence,
except that the scientist is more careful.").
21. See generally WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM
A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (2d ed., rev. 1980) (stating that knowledge is embedded in a
network of meanings).
2003]
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know are the facts, as Quine explains, facts are inevitably theory-laden.22
Therefore, in an adversary system, it is the judge whose role it is to manage
coherence by reference to what is relevant to the legal determination. This
cornerstone, it turns out, has support in cognitive psychology.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Following the Introduction, Part I
discusses the evidentiary concern about accurate information, the biological
limitations of human information processing and the possibility of improving
decisionmaking through training and repeat performance. Part II explores the
application of epistemic norms to jury decisionmaking, addresses cognitive
biases that may adversely affect jury decisionmaking, and explores the
dynamics of group decisionmaking. Part III focuses as an example of group
dynamics on the context of expert testimony on future dangerousness in
capital sentencing proceedings. This essay concludes that rule of law
aspirations to truth-seeking, rationality and justice are best served by having
the jury decide life and death issues only after judicial gatekeeping for
relevance and reliability.
I. STRUCTURED REASONING AND EMPIRICAL CORRESPONDENCE AS
RATIONAL PREREQUISITES
The twin rule of law goals of truth and rationality mean that rationality
does not operate in a closed system, but inevitably refers to the real world.23
Justice and rationality only have meaning in the context of our underlying
goals. 24  The requirements of coherence and correspondence are both
prerequisites of a framework for justice.25
22. See WILLARD V. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY
AND OTHER ESSAYS 83 (1969) (explaining the "reciprocal containment" of "epistemology in
natural science and science in epistemology"). Thus, Quine is committed to empiricism, but
finds that knowledge and theory are inseparable. See id.
23. Descriptive claims, to be valid, must correspond to the natural world, offer a logical
explanation, be falsifiable, and open to critique. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERY 276-81 (Routledge, 1992). As Quine explained, "I see the question of truth as one
to be settled within science, there being no higher tribunal." Willard V. Quine, Comment on
Lavener, in PERSPECTIVES ON QUINE 229 (Robert B. Barrett & Roger F. Gibson eds., 1990).
24. In other words, the legal system can only be understood as an institution that
implements the system of democratic governance we have chosen. Of course, even accepting
a correspondence and coherence theory of rationality does not mean that all rational minds will
agree on whatjustice requires. On the contrary, more than one theory can always be supported
by the data. See QUINE, supra note 22, at 69 (explaining that the under-determination of theory
by evidence means that more than one theory will always be supported by the data).
25. Professor Mitchell makes a distinction between psychological programs designed
to test coherence rationality, in which the important variable is internal mathematical coherence
992 [Vol. 4:987
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A. Accurate Information as a Prerequisite to Rationality
Many of the rules of evidence are based on a concern for accuracy.
Witnesses with first-hand knowledge about the circumstances and people
involved in a legal dispute are brought in to testify about their observations.
Because they might lie, the witnesses are required to take an oath. Cross-
examination is further designed to probe the accuracy of their statements.
One category of witnesses, however, is allowed to testify not because
they have observed anything about the parties or the dispute for themselves,
but because they have knowledge about how the world works-the scientific
experts. With regard to scientific experts, the concern for accuracy is not that
they will lie (although they are also required to take an oath), but twofold:
first, whether their observations are accurate, and second, whether, given the
state of knowledge about a particular scientific hypothesis proffered by the
expert, that hypothesis is useful in resolving a legal dispute. 6 The purpose of
the admissibility inquiry is to decide whether the expert can provide
information to help the factfinder resolve an issue in the case.2 7 That is, the
judge must decide whether a descriptive claim about the world has sufficient
indicia of reliability (the concern for accuracy) and relevance to the case at
hand (the concern for rationality) to enter the courtroom. For many years, that
inquiry was resolved by determining whether the expert's views were
generally accepted by the scientific community.28 There has been a major
regardless of outcome accuracy, and correspondence rationality, in which the variable studied
is how closely a person's judgment comes to empirical accuracy. See Mitchell, supra note 12,
at 1129.
26. Bear in mind that the judge does not have to decide whether a given scientific
hypothesis is actually correct. Rather, what the gatekeeper must determine is whether there are
good grounds for the expert's testimony. Once this determination has been made, it remains the
jury's province to decide which set of battling experts has the most persuasive argument.
27. See Anthony Z. Roisman, The Courts, Daubert, and Environmental Torts:
Gatekeepers or Auditors? 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 548 (1997) (observing that "when
experts offer conflicting opinions the court is not to decide which expert is correct").
28. For over seventy years, the only scientific evidence admissible in court was that
which purported to reflect a consensus of the relevant scientific community. This was the
standard articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This case explained
that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs." Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
2003]
Michigan State Law Review
paradigm shift in the way courts and litigants approach scientific evidence29
ever since the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.3° and its progeny3 instructed the federal judiciary to make admissibility
determinations based on analyzing the scientific validity of the proffered
testimony, and on whether the testimony "fits" the issues in the case.
B. Heuristics and Biases
One of the key insights of cognitive psychology is that the use of
heuristics-mental shortcuts-is a pervasive and constructive tool that humans
employ to make sense of a complex world.32 Lately heuristics have received
a "bum rap" by being lumped together with "biases."33 Heuristics, however,
29. Like all paradigm shifts, this one has created a great deal of angst among those who
operated under the old mental regime. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311
(9th Cir. 1995). Judge Kozinski, on remand, complained that "though we are largely untrained
in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing,
it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts' proposed testimony amounts to
'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,' and was 'derived by the scientific method.'
Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316.
30. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
31. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the validity inquiry to technical as well as scientific evidence).
32. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way:
Models of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 651 (1996) (proposing models of
bounded rationality that replace unrealistic views of the mind). People vary in their uses of
heuristics internally, according to context and in comparison to other people. See Gregory
Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Tradedfor Behavioral
Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEo. L.J. 67, 74-75 (2002) (explaining that there
are "individual and situational differences in rational behavior" and noting that one should not
"assume uniformity in cognitive performance across persons and situations that is not supported
by the empirical data").
33. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61 (2000) (explaining that the brain's limited ability to process
information leads people to rely on mental shortcuts, which "leaves people susceptible to all
manner of illusions: visual, mnemonic, and judgmental"); James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality
in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1333, 1343 (2001) (noting that people "exhibit various biases that prevent or distort rational
calculation"); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem ofMarket Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630,633 (1999) (observing that "cognitive
illusions-sometimes referred to as biases-are not limited to the uneducated or unintelligent, and
they are not readily capable of being unlearned") (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 4:987
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are a characteristically human way of processing information.34 They can be
extraordinarily helpful.35 Indeed, some "satisficing" heuristics may be
superior to rational algorithms in complex decision contexts.36 Simplifying
heuristics are especially useful in making complex decisions,37 such as those
confronting legal decisionmakers.
When cognitive psychologists refer to heuristics, however, they
generally mean a largely unconscious method of processing information that
can result in poor judgment and decisions with less than optimal
consequences.38 Although some scholars have questioned the applicability of
heuristics and biases research beyond the context of the particular study,39
virtually everyone agrees that sometimes heuristics can get in the way of
34. Herbert Simon attacked the perfect rationality claims of classical economics and
explained that people (like other creatures) have those cognitive abilities that best enabled them
to survive and reproduce, and that "[b]ecause of the psychological limits of the organism
(particularly with respect to computational and predictive ability), actual human rationality-
striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind of global
rationality that is implied, for example, by game-theoretical models." Herbert A. Simon, A
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 101 (1955). Notably, game theorists
have modified their views somewhat since then, partly to accommodate ideas of bounded
rationality. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW I I (1994)
(asserting that the game theory assumption of rationality "is not that individuals are self-
interested profit-maximizers or care only about money, but rather that they act in a way that is
sensible for them given their own tastes and predilections.... [l]ndividuals are likely to choose
a particular strategy when they can always do better in their own eyes by choosing that strategy
than by choosing any other"). The context of the game, the incentives of the players,
information aggregation-herd behavior-all are important considerations for game theorists as
well as cognitive psychologists. See id. at 189-218 (setting out some of these issues).
35. Indeed, I premised an earlier article on the notion that judges would make better
admissibility decisions if they used the heuristic I proffered in evaluating scientific evidence.
See Beecher-Monas, supra note 1I, at 1563.
36. See Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supra note 32, at 650 (explaining that "proponents of
the heuristics and biases program, who concluded that human inference is systematically biased
and error prone" are mistaken about the degree of error induced by this method of reasoning,
because in real-world situations characterized by "multiple pieces of information, which are not
independent, but redundant", the complexity of the task makes satisficing algorithms superior
for most tasks).
37. Bycomplex, I mean decisions that have a number of alternative solutions, a quantity
of information on which each alternative is based, and some time pressure. See, e.g., JOHN W.
PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 34 (1993) (noting that "as decisions become
more complex , people will tend to use simplifying heuristics").
38. See Mitchell, supra note 32, at 79-80 (defining judgment as "the process of
perceiving and cognitively integrating stimuli to form a 'global evaluation' about something"
and decision as "the expression of a preferential choice" expressed in words, action or a
commitment to a course of action).
39. Notable critics include Gerd Gigerenzer, Gregory Mitchell and Bradley Wendell.
2003]
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optimal decisionmaking. ° Some errors are the result of computational
limitations.' Some are the result of memory restrictions. Others are more
motivational in nature. All of these errors can lead to drastically poor
decisions under the right circumstances.42
Despite the contentions of some scholars that these biases are artifacts
of the experimental setting,43 there is little question that rational choice models
of human decisionmaking fail to reflect reality." Where people make
judgments under conditions of uncertainty (where there are no clear answers),
40. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgement, in THE
HANDBOOKOF SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK SOC. PSYCHOL.] (explaining that if actual decision making violates certain principle
of rationality "systematically (not just as a result of unreliability or 'error'), this deviation is
termed an anomaly-if the people who violate these principles simultaneously accept them as
ones that they believe should govern their decision making"); G. Gigerenzer, The Bounded
Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 284 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (presenting a
process theory of overconfidence bias successfully predicting conditions under which
overestimation occurs). Notably, even Professor Mitchell, who derides as "misleading" the
equation of heuristics and biases with error in legal judgment, concludes that "[t]he interesting
and important question for empirical research on legal judgment and decision-making is not
whether judges orjurors ever fall prey to systematic biases and errors in their reasoning-some
surely do-but rather what contexts foster good and bad reasoning." Mitchell, supra note 12,
at 1147. This essay offers an analysis of the allocation of decisionmaking between judge and
jury that demonstrates how gatekeeping requirements foster good reasoning.
41. See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS: HOW TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS
DECEIVE You 242-43 (2002) (training students to draw conclusions from numbers is more
successful if they are taught to translate probabilistic statistics into frequentist representations).
42. See Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 13, at 388 (explaining that people "use different
information-processing strategies in different situations" so that, for example, the pressure to
justify one's views may actually magnify the dilution effect).
43. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 12, at 1082 (asserting that "[a]doption of the strong
form of the 'legal actor as cognitive miser' proposition, which posits that systematic bias and
error will infect all legal judgments, is not justifiable given the normative, methodological, and
empirical limitations on the heuristics and biases research program"). Notably, this essay does
not assert that all legal judgments are "infected" by irrationality. Rather, I argue that the rule
of law goals of rationality and truth are better met by structuring the decision process in such
a way as to take into account the way people think, and that doing so can improve the quality
ofjudgment and decisionmaking. Even such skeptics as Professor Mitchell acknowledge that
"there is indisputable empirical proof that humans often fail to achieve perfect rationality in
their judgment and decision-making behavior." Id. at 1083 n.22. It is the goal of this essay to
examine whether the requirement of judicial gatekeeping can assist in the goal of achieving
rationality.
44. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, On the Gentle Art of Rational Choice Bashing, in
INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE 239, 240 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1993) ("Only an
idiot (or an economist) would claim that rational choice models can explain all of human
behavior.").
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they are particularly likely to use short-cuts.45 People using these heuristics
may be behaving rationally in the sense of conserving time, but their decisions
differ from what the rational actor approach of economics would have
predicted.46 Judgmental accuracy may also be impaired.
Professor Mitchell has raised the question of how generalizable the
findings of cognitive psychology are to legal applications.4 7 He points out
many of the limitations of laboratory studies, and questions their relevance to
the context in which legal participants must make decisions.4" The question
of generalizability is an important one, although it is "never completely
answerable."49 The issues of how similar are the people studied to the people
to whom the results will be applied, and the similarity between the situations
45. These "quirks" are often called heuristics and biases, but whatever they are called,
the idea is that people take cognitive shortcuts as a strategy for processing information. See
PAYNE ET AL., supra note 37, at 2 (explaining that strategies for processing information vary
from the rational choice model when people are faced with complex choice problems with many
alternatives). These are not irrational responses, although the resulting decision maybe less than
optimal. See id. (noting that "people have multiple goals including to be accurate and the desire
to conserve cognitive resources"). As Professor Mitchell points out, some people exhibit these
quirks more than others, and in some contexts more than others. See Mitchell, supra note 32,
at 74-75 (explaining that there are "individual and situational differences in rational behavior"
and noting that one should not "assume uniformity in cognitive performance across persons and
situations that is not supported by the empirical data"). Nonetheless, the unconscious tendency
of most people to take these cognitive shortcuts has been well documented in a number of
situations applicable to jury decisionmaking, and understanding these tendencies and how to
counteract them can vastly improve the way information is presented by experts and understood
by juries.
46. In other words, individual behavior may systematically depart from the formal
axioms of rationality supplied by expected utility theory. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
47. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 1106.
48. See id. at 1107.
49. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 506 (1986) (quoting DONALDT.
CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
RESEARCH 5 (1963)) (explaining how to evaluate "how far beyond the specific facts of the study
validly-produced research findings remain valid").
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investigated and those of current interest are both important inquiries.5
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to generalize from the cognitive studies
of each of the anomalies discussed in this essay.
First, people are biologically very similar.5 Second, biologically
speaking, people's thought processes develop as the brain does, and these
thought processes are remarkably consistent across cultures." Although
people unquestionably have different cultural experiences that influence their
thinking to some degree, there are basic similarities in memory and learning
that are pervasive and transcend language and culture. More research would,
as always, be helpful, but that does not make inferences from the existing data
illegitimate.
Although human memory and attention are limited because of brain
structure and function, across cultures people tend to make inferences as
though both were infallible, resulting in cognitive short-cuts." These are
unconscious processes, and doubtlessly enable people to make decisions that
are fast, and, on average, accurate enough. 4 It also keeps people from being
50. See id. For example, college students are often used in cognitive studies. Because
these students are "on average, younger, brighter, and more affluent than the typical jury
population", one may question whether the study results are applicable tojury decisionmaking.
See id. at 506-07. But one can disregard the results only if youth, affluence, or intelligence can
be shown to affect the decision. Professor Mitchell has given us neither studies showing that
they do, nor theory explaining why they should. In fact, in response to the critique about using
college students and unrealistic laboratory conditions, a great deal of research has attempted
more realistic studies, and those results incorporated into the jury deliberation literature. See,
e.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 622 (2001). The cognitive heuristics and
biases research program has been remarkably resilient. As Monahan and Walker explain: "The
trustworthiness of a study increases as independent investigators arrive at a common conclusion.
The more often a study is confirmed by subsequent research, the less likely it is that chance
fluctuations in the data accounted for the results of the original research." See Monahan &
Walker, supra note 49, at 508.
51. Memory, for example, is a dynamic systemic property of neurons in which the brain
records how the body explores and reacts to the world. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE
FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 15-19
(1999).
52. For a discussion of the cross-cultural use of metaphor, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
53. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 750 (2000) (observing that
"people make inferences based on attention and memory as if these processes are infallible, even
though both are error-prone").
54. See Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supra note 32, at 651, 655 (designing and empirically
testing satisficing algorithms of bounded rationality against statistically rational algorithms to
solve real world problems of limited knowledge and finding that the statisficing algorithms
scored the highest proportion of correct inferences in the shortest time).
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paralyzed into inaction."5 Although this may confer an evolutionary advantage
to humans as a species, it does not lead to optimal decisionmaking in all
situations. 6 In other words, the satisficing" strategies that people adopt to
solve complex problems with limited resources may have long-term value for
humans as a species, but they can also lead to errors in judgment. 8
C. A Structured Reasoning Process Improves Judgment
These kinds of systematic decision errors in judgment are not
irremediable. Decisions that are less than optimal because of statisficing
strategies can be improved. 9 People benefit from decision aids.60 Training
in reasoning improves performance dramatically.6 People can be taught to
think correctly and to retain this knowledge. 2 People are capable of sound
reasoning if the information is presented to them correctly.63 That is why it
is essential that the legal system-aspiring as it does to rationality-ought to
identify the conditions under which the use of otherwise helpful heuristics
55. See, e.g., SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND
THE HEALTHY MIND 212-14 (1989) (noting that the only people who do not suffer from
overoptimism bias about their chances for success in the future are the clinically depressed).
56. See Dawes, supra note 40, at 497 (explaining that ifactual decision making violates
certain principle ofrationality "systematically (notjust as a result of unreliability or 'error'), this
deviation is termed an anomaly-if the people who violate these principles simultaneously accept
them as ones that they believe should govern their decision making").
57. See Simon, supra note 34, at 101 (explaining "satisficing" as the concept that while
human rationality may not meet the economic goals of rational self-maximizing, it is usually
good enough to achieve most of the goals of the individual under most of the circumstances the
individual encounters).
58. See PAYNE ET AL., supra note 37, at 5 ("Flexibility in response may have long-run
value; however, it unfortunately can also lead to short-term errors in judgment.").
59. See id. at 13 (noting the tradeoffs between accuracy and effort).
60. See id. at 7 (using the example of supermarket price unit information, which
consumers tended to ignore until the format was changed, making the information more
available by ranking unit prices from lowest to highest).
61. See Christopher Jepson et al., Inductive Reasoning: Competence or Skill?, 6 BEHAV.
& BRAIN Sci. 494, 498 (1983) (discussing studies); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching
Reasoning, 238 SCI. 625, 630 (1987) (advocating formal training in the "rules underlying
reasoning").
62. See GIGERENZER, supra note 41, at 242-43 (describing the successful training of
students in making correct statistical inferences).
63. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive,
Normative, and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 15 (1996) (citing
studies demonstrating that when information is presented in certain ways people are capable of
sound probabilistic reasoning).
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may result in biased (less than optimal) decisionmaking and attempt to
structure legal decisionmaking in such a way as to minimize these biases.64
For example, repeat decisionmaking in the presence of unambiguous
feedback improves judgment.65 As repeat decisionmakers on evidentiary
issues, who get fairly unambiguous feedback in the form of reversals, the
choice of judges for such tasks may make some sense. Moreover, we know
that training is much more effective for pragmatic applications of reasoning
than for abstract principles,66 so thatjudicial training in how to apply Daubert
principles may actually serve some useful purpose. In addition, the
accountability of judges may improve their decisions in evidentiary matters.
Accountability, which refers to the expectation that one may have to
justify one's actions,67 can improve judgment if certain conditions are met.6"
An unknown audience that the decisionmaker views as legitimate may assist
people who know that they will be held accountable beforehand in making
better decisions by engaging in preemptive self-criticism, as long as there exist
formal decision rules that can correct the mental processes involved.69 Those
64. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 547 (2002) (examining the
implications of cognitive psychology forjudicial review of agency rulemaking and concluding
that one important mechanism for avoiding bad decisions is to hold decisionmakers responsible
for their choices, and that "[i]f structured properly, accountability can attenuate many of the
systematic biases that flow from improper use of decisionmaking shortcuts").
65. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 63, at 6 (citing studies showing that people learned
to use base rates more effectively after receiving feedback about their errors from their
experience; for example, physicians who learned the low base rate of pneumonia from their
practice experience relied heavily on the base rate when making diagnoses, and auditors
"learned and used the base rate for financial statement errors most easily by directly
experiencing those errors"; but cautioning that "personally experienced base rates were used
only by those who also experienced the relationship between the base rate and the diagnostic
information").
66. See Patricia W. Cheng et al., Pragmatic Versus Syntactic Approaches to Training
Deductive Reasoning, in RULES FOR REASONING 186 (Richard E. Nisbett ed., 1993) (noting that
"[t]he near total ineffectiveness of purely abstract training in logic contrasts dramatically with
the ready ease with which people seem able to apply a naturally acquired pragmatic reasoning
schema" and noting that people "who received a brief training session on the obligation schema
improved markedly on selection problems interpretable in terms of that schema").
67. See Jennifer S. Lemer & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999) (reviewing the literature on
accountability).
68. See id. at 270 ("This review underscores the falsity of the conventional
wisdom... that accountability is a cognitive or social panacea ... ").
69. The necessary conditions are, principally, "an audience (a) whose views are
unknown, (b) who is interested in accuracy, (c) who is interested in processes rather than
specific outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well-informed, and (e) who has a legitimate reason for
inquiring into the reasons behind participants' judgments." Id. at 259. Lerner and Tetlock
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appear to be the conditions of a judge making decisions about evidentiary
admissibility, but not those of a jury.
II. JURY DECISIONMAKING ABOUT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Evidence rules-or the lack of them-determine what information thejury
will be able to use for its determination.70 The purpose of permitting
experts-witnesses without personal knowledge of the defendant or incident-to
testify is to inform the jury about matters outside their common experience.
Why, however, do we need gatekeepers? Does judicial gatekeeping actually
promote more accurate and more rational legal decisionmaking?7"
The question of whether initial screening by the judge for scientific
validity is necessary for rationality is one on which even the Supreme Court
is divided. The Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle72 thought the adversary
system could be relied upon to present enough information to jurors so that
they could sort reliable from unreliable expert testimony. The Daubert Court
thought expert testimony needed to be screened for relevance first. Which
Court was correct?
A. Cognitive Biases that May Affect Evidence Evaluation
Judges and juries must make decisions that have a number of alternative
solutions, the choice of which will vary based on the information presented,
explain that while process accountability increases both accuracy and calibration (the correlation
between accuracy and confidence), outcome accountability decreases calibration and increases
judgment inconsistency, but they also note that "there is no reason to suppose that all kinds of
[process accountability] will work the same way." Id. at 258.
70. See Brian Leiter, The Epistemology ofAdmissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy
of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 809
(explaining that if Frye is wrong, it is for reasons of law, not reasons of science, because the
epistemic norms in science and law are different). I agree with Professor Leiter that the rules
of admissibility need to be evaluated in terms of the goals of law rather than the goals of
science, but I disagree with his conclusion that jurors are as competent as judges in evaluating
junk science. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science
in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 75 (1998).
71. The question asked by social epistemology is what norms work best under the real
world limits of a particular social practice. See Leiter, supra note 70, at 814-17 (suggesting two
lines of inquiry: "paternalism," whether substituting judicial screening will enable jurors to
make more accurate decisions; and "ought implies can," that is, whether shortcomings in
cognition will preclude either judges or jurors from making an accurate decision).
72. 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (refusing to exclude future dangerousness testimony as a
constitutional matter because the defense could not show that "psychiatrists are always wrong
with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time").
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and they must make these decisions within a limited time frame. This is the
definition of complex decisionmaking and it has implications for the quality
of the judgment reached. Empirically, juries have difficulty in assessing
scientific testimony.73 So do judges.74
However, although judges are just as prone to use unconscious shortcuts
as juries, there are a number of factors that counteract this tendency in
judges. First, the structured reasoning process undertaken in a Daubert
inquiry improves performance in cognitive tasks." Second, judges are repeat
players in the way thatjuries are not. Repeat exposure to the decisionmaking
task-at least in the presence of feedback-can improve performance.76 Third,
judges are accountable, at least in some respects; they must present the basis
for their decisions, and that basis is subject to scrutiny and to being overruled
by a higher court. Accountability, which is difficult to achieve for group
73. See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific
Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 267, 270 (2001) (research suggests that jurors are incapable of differentiating more
scientifically valid expert testimony from less accurate testimony).
74. In a study of state court judges, Sophia I. Gatowski and her colleagues found that
although judges overwhelmingly endorsed a gatekeeping role for judges even in those states
following the general consensus standard, a fair percentage of them could not apply the
standards correctly. See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey
ofJudges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 433
(2001) (finding that with respect to the most important inquiries, falsifiability and error rate,
thirty-five percent of judges' explanations of falsifiability were unequivocally wrong, ten
percent were wrong in their assessment of error rate and eighty-six percent gave error rates that
were equivocal). For a critique of courts post-Daubert handling of scientific evidence, see
Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1481 (1995).
75. See Jepson et al., supra note 61, at 498 (discussing studies indicating that training
in reasoning improves performance dramatically); Nisbett et al., supra note 61, at 630
(advocating formal training in the "rules underlying reasoning"). Training is much more
effective for pragmatic applications of reasoning than for abstract principles. See Cheng et al.,
supra note 66, at 186 (noting that "[t]he near total ineffectiveness of purely abstract training in
logic contrasts dramatically with the ready ease with which people seem able to apply a
naturally acquired pragmatic reasoning schema" and noting that people "who received a brief
training session on the obligation schema improved markedly on selection problems
interpretable in terms of that schema").
76. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 63, at 6 (citing studies showing that people learned
to use base rates more effectively after receiving feedback about their errors from their
experience; for example physicians who learned the low base rate of pneumonia from their
practice experience relied heavily on the base rate when making diagnoses, and auditors
"learned and used the base rate for financial statement errors most easily by directly
experiencing those errors"; but cautioning that "personally experienced base rates were used
only by those who also experienced the relationship between the base rate and the diagnostic
information").
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judgments, like those made by the jury, is more effective for individual
decisionmakers, like a trial judge." "Accountability for one's inferences
produces more thorough and more elaborate processing that takes account of
more information and that is, at least sometimes, more accurate than
processing that occurs in the absence of accountability.""8  Individual
judgments under conditions of accountability are more likely to be careful and
thoughtful.79 These studies indicate the soundness of judicial screening for
relevance and reliability.
Jurors who are presented with expert testimony that has not been
scrutinized for scientific validity may have a difficult time sorting the wheat
from the chaff. A cognitive bias known as the dilution effect occurs when
people are presented with complex information, some of which is relevant to
the decision task and some of which is irrelevant.8 The probability that a
particular choice will be made should not vary with the amount of information
available, 8 nor should irrelevant information enter into a judgment," but it
does. 3 The dilution effect occurs when irrelevant information dilutes relevant
information, leading to less accurate judgments than when only relevant
information was available. 4
In studies of this effect, participants responded differently to stories
detailing the same phenomenon but containing different amounts and kinds of
77. See Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have
Learned and What Needs to be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 361 (1991); see also Seidenfeld,
supra note 64, at 544 (discussing the phenomenon of cognitive loafing).
78. Shelley E. Taylor, The Social Being in Social Psychology, in I HANDBOOK SOC.
PSYCHOL., supra note 40, at 58, 76.
79. See Bettenhausen, supra note 77, at 361 (citing studies demonstrating that people
in groups of sixteen who shared responsibility for the judgment task "used less complex
judgment strategies than subjects working alone" although "multiple judges who expected to
justify their judgments worked as hard as individual judges").
80. Some of the classic work on the dilution effect was that of Philip E. Tetlock and his
co-authors. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Dilution Effect: Judgmental Bias,
Conversational Convention, or a Bit of Both?, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 915, 916-17 (1996)
(citing studies demonstrating that "linking diagnostic with nondiagnostic evidence produced
more regressive predictions than people would otherwise have made").
81. See Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J.
CONSUMER RES. 419 (1982) (discussing studies on information load effects).
82. See Dawes, supra note 40, at 537 (noting that "[s]omeone who has a strong opinion
based on very clear evidence may be influenced to 'moderate' this opinion by exposure to a
flurry of uninformative information").
83. See id. (stating that when people are considering evidence for a hypothesis,
irrelevant information should be ignored, but it is not).
84. See N. John Castellan, Jr., Multiple-Cue Probability Learning with Irrelevant Cues,
9 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 16, 26 (1973) (stating that study participants were
unable to ignore irrelevant information even after a large number of trials).
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information. 5 Although the probability that a particular choice will be made
should not vary with the number of irrelevant facts available, 6 irrelevant
information that should not enter into a judgment nonetheless creeps in. 7
When people are asked to judge whether someone else has a particular
characteristic, such as aggressiveness, theirjudgments tend to be more focused
(and accurate) when they are presented with only relevant information; even
when details are obviously irrelevant, they still appear to affect judgment.8
Physical attractiveness of the defendant should not affect the verdict, for
example, but a number of jury studies have shown a "leniency shift" toward
an attractive defendant, but not for an unattractive defendant.8 9
Two heuristics are thought to underlie the dilution phenomenon: the
representativeness heuristic and the norms of social discourse.90 In the first
explanation, the dilution problem arises because irrelevant information
obscures what is relevant. 91 The representativeness heuristic is one in which
people rely on representative patterns-stereotypes-in reaching a decision.92
Rational choice and Bayes theorem predict that rational people consider the
statistical probability that an event will occur and update it with particularized
85. See Henry Zuckier, The Dilution Effect: The Role of the Correlation and the
Dispersion of Predictor Variables in the Use of Nondiagnostic Information, 43 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1163 (1982).
86. See Dawes, supra note 40, at 505 (explaining that dilution occurs "when evidence
that does not distinguish between hypotheses in fact influences people to change their mind").
87. See id. at 537.
88. See id. at 532 ("Dilution effects occur when evidence that does not distinguish
between hypotheses in fact influences people to change their mind.") (emphasis omitted).
89. See Devine et al., supra note 50, at 679 (citing mock jury studies by R.R. Izzet &
W. Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated
Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271 (1974); See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment:
Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 714-15 (1996) (describing the
MacCoun (1990) study and finding its conclusion that dilution effects are greater amongjuries
than individual jurors to be consistent with computer analyses).
90. See Seidenfeld, supra note 64, at 503.
91. "[D]ecisionmakers allow irrelevant information to alter the decisions that they
would otherwise choose by considering only relevant information." Id. at 502 (using the
example of a guess about a student's grade point average, where people gave very different
predictions about a student's grade point average when they were told only the number of hours
studied weekly than when they were told not only the number of hours studied but also how
many plants the student kept). There are two major explanations for this effect, the
representativeness heuristic, in which people select outcomes depending on the degree to which
the evidence fits stereotypical patterns, and norms about social discourse, in which the
experiment participants expect that information given them is relevant to their task. See id.
92. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972). These shortcuts are not consciously
employed, but operate on a subliminal level to affect decision. See id.
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specific information. In fact, people ignore base rates93 and adhere to
stereotypes by overestimating the correlation between what something appears
to be and what it is. For example, in assessing the career of a person
described as overbearing, aggressive, rude, and skilled at rhetorical argument,
people will refer mentally to known stereotypes rather than population base
rates.94 People think by association and respond to patterns-even infants
recognize shape patterns.95 This is a characteristic of human thought and
undoubtedly speeds up the thinking process, but it has a downside.
The social norms heuristic (which is a second postulated reason for the
dilution effect), hypothesizes that, in a testing context, people focus on social
cues and assume that the experimenter would not be presenting them with
93. The base rate is the frequency of a given subject in the population. For example,
if a sample of one hundred people consists of seventy lawyers and thirty engineers, the base rate
of lawyers is seventy percent, and of engineers, thirty percent. Knowing only that, if you were
asked the occupation of any given person, you would be wise to answer "lawyer." Interestingly,
most people do not. In a study in which subjects were divided into two groups, both of which
were told that one hundred people were either lawyers or engineers, one subject group was told
there were seventy lawyers and thirty engineers, the other group that there were thirty lawyers
and seventy engineers, and both groups were given thumbnail descriptions of the people written
by psychologists, designed to be nondiagnostic with respect to occupation. See Nisbett et al.,
supra note 61, at 625. In both groups, the subjects based their answers on stereotypes rather
than population base rates. See id.
94. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Availability]. There
is an ongoing debate between Kahneman/Tversky and Gigerenzer about whether this is a
reasoning error or not, with the focus of the disagreement on interpretations of probability. See,
e.g., Gigerenzer, supra note 40, at 291-97 (arguing that you cannot assign probabilities to
unique events and that therefore there is no normative basis for assigning error to stereotyping,
and suggesting errors are eliminated by asking questions in terms of frequencies rather than in
terms of probabilities and increasing the use of random sampling); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582,589 (1996) [hereinafter
Kahneman & Tversky, Reality] (acknowledging that representation in terms of absolute
frequencies improves accuracy, but citing studies to demonstrate that people nonetheless
perceive correlations that do not exist and that "some significant judgmental biases are not
readily corrected by the observation of natural frequencies"). For purposes of our discussion,
it is enough to note that both sides agree that information is rarely presented to decisionmakers
in a form-frequency that is optimal for accuracy.
95. See, e.g., Roger Lecuyer & Christine Cybula, Categorization of Geometric Figures
Composed of Three or Four Elements by 3-month-old Infants, CURRENT PSYCHOL. COGNITION
221,221-44 (2000) (noting studies showing that infants recognize geometric patterns); Dawes,
supra note 40, at 534 (explaining the problems of representativeness and pseudodiagnosticity
as probabilistic fallacies).
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information unless they were expected to consider it.96 People may believe
that the information provided to them in such a context is honest, relevant and
appropriately specific.97 Under this rationale, jurors, who understand that
information is being screened in this way, may be especially prone to the
dilution effect. Experts (like judges) are less likely to suffer from dilution
effects, because repeated exposure in the presence of feedback increases the
ability to filter irrelevant from relevant information.98 On the other hand, this
effect is made worse if the decisionmaker is accountable.99 In that case, the
decisionmaker searches for all evidence-even irrelevant evidence-that might
possibly have bearing on the solution. There is some evidence that group
processes decrease the dilution effect.'00 This is true, however, only if the
resulting bias is nonsystematic, that is if each member ignores different
information. When the irrelevant information plays into commonly held
stereotypes, it may skew the decisions in a systematic fashion. The dilution
effect explains the harmful consequences of simply permitting thejury to hear
expert testimony and then letting the jury try to sort out its relevance for
themselves without initial judicial screening for relevance and reliability.
B. Egocentric Biases: Self-Interest and Cognitive Dissonance
People across cultures have a well-documented tendency to overrate
their abilities and their control over events, at least when the questions are
difficult and the decisionmakers have no prior experience in making such
96. See Tetlock et al., supra note 80, at 916 (observing that "[flar from representing an
error, the dilution effect may constitute a rational response to the interpersonal and institutional
demands that impinge on individual perceivers").
97. See id.
98. See Seidenfeld, supra note 64, at 504.
99. See Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 13, at 388; Dawes, supra note 40, at 537.
100. See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group
Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 155 (1997).
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decisions.' Across cultures, people appear to overestimate their ability to
provide correct answers to questions. 0 2 People think that they have better
judgment than they do.'0 3 Moreover, this tendency is exacerbated in people
acting within small social networks," 4 characterized by having three to fifteen
members (a characteristic juries, normally twelve members, share); with
someone in a central, coordinating position (here, thejudge), and weak contact
with outsiders (juries are typically told not to discuss the case with anyone).
The explanations for overconfidence bias are that people "confuse easily
drawn inferences for easily remembered facts", 5 people selectively focus on
evidence that is consistent with their first impression and ignore inconsistent
101. See Gigerenzer, supra note 40, at 297-300 (noting the results of two decades of
research showing that test participants were overconfident whenjudging the correctness oftheir
answers to difficult general knowledge questions, but that when they were directed to assess
their correctness with reference to their prior experience in answering similar general knowledge
tests, their overconfidence disappears). The problem for jurors is that they do not have any such
reference points when it comes to assessing the defendant's dangerousness. The major
determinant of overconfidence is the difficulty of the question. See Lyle A. Brenner et al.,
Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination, 65 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 212, 213 (1996) (observing that "the major (though not
the sole) determinant of overconfidence is the difficulty of the questions"). Overconfidence has
been observed in a number of predictive tasks, including physicians' predictions of disease,
economists' forecasts of recession, and players' predictions of their opponents' moves. See id.
at 213 (citing studies). However, as one researcher points out, we do not know if the kind of
question domain makes a difference, or "whether there are simply some domains in which we
tend to exaggerate the accuracy of our knowledge or judgment (not in others)." Robyn M.
Dawes & Matthew Mulford, The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in
Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 201, 210 (1996). Nonetheless, although we do not know whether the results in the
general knowledge questions are equally applicable to the decision the jurors make in capital
sentencing, if our goal is to improve accuracy, we should implement ways of minimizing such
effects.
102. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 1113-14 (citing studies showing that, with the
exception ofJapanese and Singaporeans, Asians are even more overconfident than Westerners).
103. See Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance Reduction, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 373 (2001) (citing studies asking people to evaluate their
ability in solving laboratory problems and showing that "people think that they can solve
problems that they cannot, think that they have made progress toward correct solutions when
they have not, and think that they have drawn correct conclusions when they have not").
104. See Joshua Klayman et al., Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom
You Ask, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 216, 243 (1999) (finding an overall
bias toward overconfidence, particularly in small social networks).
105. Blanton et al., supra note 103, at 374 (citing studies).
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evidence,'° 6 and that people's overconfidence is a buffer against anxiety.0 7
Overconfidence may be amplified when people tend to take further actions
that justify and reinforce decisions that they have already made.' For
example, gamblers and voters are more confident after they have placed their
bets or votes than they were before.0 9
C. Group Dynamics and Polarization Effects
Legal decisionmaking at trial has two aspects: individual, in the person
of the judge, and group, in the form of the jury. Although there is strong
evidence that group decisions are better than individual decisions when
evaluating information that has a demonstrably correct solution,"0 most
decisions that juries are called upon to make do not have clear answers.''
Complex decisions are not necessarily improved by group processes." 2
Moreover, when the individuals in a group share a particular bias, group
processes tend to magnify its effect.' 3 Group final judgment depends on both
where the individual members begin deliberation and the processes in which
the group combines preferences to define a group decision.' Group
106. See id. (citing studies); Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to
Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Eddie
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999) (citing studies demonstrating that people selectively
seek information that will decrease expected post-decision dissonance).
107. See Jeff Greenberg et al., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? Converging Evidence
that Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety-Buffering Function, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
913, 913-21 (1992) (arguing that self-deception sustains the illusion of control and diminishes
anxiety).
108. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). Festinger's
theory provoked a great deal of controversy, but the empirical basis for it appears to have
survived the controversy. See, e.g., Dawes, supra note 40, at 557-61, 561 (detailing the
controversy and concluding that "cognitive dissonance theory is resilient").
109. See Blanton et al., supra note 103, at 374 (arguing that "overconfidence reflects the
motive to maintain a view of the self as a knowledgeable perceiver who makes sound
judgments") (citing studies).
110. See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 100, at 149.
111. As Gigone and Hastie explain, "groups performing tasks that involve solutions that
are not easily demonstrable tend to perform at the level of their average members." Id.
112. See id.; see also Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N+I
Heads Better Than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 535 (1982) (stating that "research confirms
the belief that the performance of one exceptional individual can be superior to that of a
committee, especially if the committee is trying to solve a complex problem and if the
committee contains a number of low-ability members") (citations omitted).
113. See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 100, at 159.
114. See Kerr et al., supra note 89, at 694.
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polarization effects have been demonstrated for attitudes toward capital
punishment, judgments about facts, and perceptions about people." 5 In group
decisions, although random errors in assessing information tend to cancel each
other out, systematic biases may be amplified.116 Individual biases and group
dynamics are thus both important facets of the decisionmaking process.
Although both individual and group decisionmaking are subject to
biases-that is, decisions about what and how information is relevant "'7-there
are some characteristics of group decisionmaking that emphasize the
importance of protecting the jury from irrelevant information that exacerbates
biases. Group decisions are better than individual decisions when evaluating
information that has a demonstrably correct solution."' The reason for this
is that the errors of individuals in assessing information tend to cancel each
other out." 9 Thus, I am not arguing that the jury should be replaced in
criminal trials, or in capital sentencing proceedings. I am suggesting that in
the context of sentencing proceedings, the confluence of systematic errors
requires thatjudges carefully screen information that the jury will use to make
its collective decision.
The argument that collective decisionmaking should cancel out
judgmental errors does not work for systematic biases." 0 In other words, if
everyone is making the same (erroneous) assumptions, the result is apt to be
far worse than if the decisionmakers were individual. Collective processes
under certain conditions skew the decision away from judgmental accuracy.' 2
Rather than achieving a compromise solution that reflects the average of the
115. See Paul E. Jones & Peter H.M.P. Roelofsma, The Potentialfor Social Contextual
and Group Biases in Team Decision-making: Biases, Conditions and Psychological
Mechanisms, 43 ERGONOMICS 1129, 1144 (2000) (discussing the "overwhelming number of
studies" demonstrating group polarization).
116. See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 100, at 159 (observing the cancellation of
uncorrelated errors in group decisionmaking).
117. See Kerr et al., supra note 89, at 714-15 (defining bias as reflecting "decisions
about whether and how to use information" and demonstrating that "groups will amplify bias
under some conditions but attenuate it under others"); Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction
with Others Increases Decision Confidence But Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against
Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision Making, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 305, 323 (1995) (concluding that individual interactive decisionmaking
exhibits similar characteristics to group consensus decisionmaking).
118. See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 100, at 149.
119. See id. at 159 (observing the cancellation of uncorrelated errors in group
decisionmaking).
120. See Kerr et al., supra note 89, at 713-14 (noting that although the law of large
numbers suggests that random errors will cancel each other out in collective decisions, it will
not do so for systematic errors).
121. See id. at 714-15 (citing studies).
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members' initial position, groups often polarize; that is, the group will make
a more extreme decisions than the individuals' initial positions would have
predicted.'22 The result is that group decisions may move toward an extreme
position rather than to the middle of the individually held antecedent
positions. 23
For polarization to occur, there must be an initial leaning of the group in
a particular direction. 2 4 There are a number of explanations for this tendency,
such as social comparison theory (people initially espouse opinions less
extreme than their true opinion because they fear being labeled deviant, and
once they realize that others have more extreme opinions they shift theirs' to
the true value); persuasive arguments theory (explaining group polarization
on the basis of a pool of arguments drawn from discussion among the group
members); self-categorization theory (group members define the social
identity of the group and then modify their positions to conform with it);
social influence network theory (a network of interpersonal influence); and
social decisions schemes (the distribution of initial opinions specifies the
relative influence of the alternative initial positions of group members).' 25
The initial studies of group polarization involved the "risky shift," a choice
shift in the direction of risk preference.'26 This does not mean that groups
always will be risk seeking. There is also a "cautious shift," but if the context
122. See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-
Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1141 (1986) (noting that "an initial
tendency of individual group members toward a given direction is enhanced following group
discussion").
123. See id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71, 85-86 (2000) (observing that "[t]he effect of deliberation is both
to decrease variance among group members, as individual differences diminish, and also to
produce convergence on a relatively more extreme point among predeliberation judgments").
124. See Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 856,
857 (1999) (explaining the concept of group polarization in terms of a choice shift, which
occurs "when, after a group's interaction on an issue, the mean final opinion of group members
differs from the members' mean initial opinion ... in the opposite direction of the initial
inclination of the group").
125. See id. at 857-59 (discussing alternative explanations).
126. See James A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions: The
Influence of Widely Held Values, 4 J. ExPT'L SOC. PSYCHOL. 442, 443 (1968). The initial
studies involved asking study participants to advise engineers about whether to quit a securejob
for a riskier one that paid more. The participants were asked at what level of risk the engineer
should take the offer and the group assessment of the proper risk level was significantly higher
than the members' initial choices. See id. at 447. For a discussion of these studies, see Dan
Hunter, Philippic.corn, 90 CAL. L. REv. 611, 641 (2002) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLICCOM (2001)).
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is one in which a systemic bias can be predicted, group polarization may
magnify the effect.'27
Essentially, if the group members already have a predilection in attitude,
group dynamics intensify the predilection and result in a more extreme
judgment. 128 For example, when there is an underlying norm endorsing capital
punishment, individuals would attempt to signal that they shared the group
attitude. 129 This results in a kind of competition, but since no one can be sure
exactly what the average is, the value moves in the direction favored by the
group norm.13 ° This effect has been observed in studies where the group
categorized itself as either risk-taking or cautious and group decisions were
observed to polarize in the risky direction by stereotypically risk seeking
groups and in the cautious direction by self-perceived cautious groups,
although risky and cautious individuals tended to shift away from their
individual predilection.13'
Apparently, this polarization phenomenon is a function of group
discussion.3 2 One explanation for group polarization is that groups have an
internal culture that prefers some values over others.'33 During discussion,
group members attempt to signal their adherence to these group norms, but
because they do not know ahead of time the level of group adherence to these
norms, the result is a competition that shifts the initial preferences to a more
extreme level.'34 This means that if group members share a particular bias,
127. See ROGER WILLIAM BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 211 (2d ed. 1986).
128. As Noah Friedkin explained, "[a] choice shift is said to occur when, after a group's
interaction on an issue, the mean final opinion of group members differs from the members'
mean initial opinion. Group polarization is said to occur when the choice shift is in the same
direction as the mean initial opinion." Friedkin, supra note 124, at 857.
129. See ROBERT S. BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION
73 (1992) (discussing the process of polarization); Robert Steven Baron & Gard Roper,
Reaffirmation of Social Comparison Views of Choice Shifts: Averaging and Extremity Effects
in an Autokinetic Situation, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 521, 528-30 (1976)
(hypothesizing that members strive to show adherence to group norms).
130. See Seidenfeld, supra note 64, at 536 (explaining the competition to express the
group norm that results in polarization).
131. See John C. Turner et al., Referent Informational Influence and Group Polarization,
28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 135, 143 (1989) (noting that "defining the shared
characteristics ... in advance will ensure that arguments/positions/members in line with the
stereotype will tend to be perceived as more representative of the group as a whole and hence
more persuasive and valued").
132. See BARON ET AL., supra note 129, at 73 (noting the "process whereby group
discussion tends to intensify group opinion, producing more extreme judgments among group
members than existed before [the] discussion").
133. See Baron & Roper, supra note 129, at 528-30.
134. See Glenn S. Sanders & Robert S. Baron, Is Social Comparison Irrelevant for
Producing Choice Shifts? 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 303, 311 (1977).
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group dynamics may intensify its impact. 3 ' People wish to be perceived
favorably by the group, so they adjust their expressed opinion in line with
their image of the group position, an image already polarized because of its
prototypical nature. 13
6
Another explanation for the polarization effect is that the initial
declaration of the individual's position was more moderate than the position
the individual really held. 37 During group deliberations, as the individual
realizes the group position is more extreme, the individual is freed to express
these more extreme views.'38 In this explanation, there is not really a shift in
underlying attitudes, but merely an increased willingness to express previously
held views. Both this and the prior explanation are social comparison
theories, and suggest that group polarization occurs when high status members
of the group hold more extreme views than the mean. 39 Thus, if the jury
foreperson or other influential member has a predilection for a particular view,
that person may shift the group decision. Rather than fracturing the group into
opposing views, polarization is a consensual shift further in the direction of
the group's initial tendency. 40
Yet another explanation for group polarization is the persuasive
arguments theory.'4 ' Here, the deciding factors are the number and
persuasiveness of the arguments mustered in support of a given position. 4
This theory also relies on a notion of underlying group orientation. Under this
theory, group polarization occurs when there is a disproportionately large
number of persuasive arguments in the direction the group is leaning."'
135. See id. at 304.
136. See JOHN TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP 156 (1987).
137. See Isenberg, supra note 122, at 1142.
138. See id.
139. See George R. Goethals & Mark P. Zanna, The Role of Social Comparison in
Choice Shifts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1469 (1979).
140. See James H. Liu & Bibb Latan, Extremization of Attitudes: Does Thought and
Discussion-Induced Polarization Cumulate?, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 103
(1998) (noting the difference between popular conceptions of polarization and social
scientists').
141. See Eugene Bumstein & Amiram Vinokur, What a Person Thinks Upon Learning
He Has Chosen Differently from Others: Nice Evidence for the Persuasive-Arguments
Explanation of Choice Shis, II J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 412 (1975) (discussing shifts
in choice even without discussion, based on knowledge of others' preferences).
142. Seeid. at412.
143. See Eugene Burnstein & Amiram Vinokur, Persuasive Argumentation and Social
Comparison as Determinants ofAttitude Polarization, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 315
(1977) (polarization as a result of informational influence).
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In mock-jury studies,' polarization around the question of guilt or
innocence has been well documented.'45 In interactive groups, rather than
responding to information against their position by modifying their position
or lowering their confidence, researchers have found that group members'
interaction increases peoples' confidence in their decision in a way that is not
144. Mockjury experiments are frequently castigated as lacking the real-world context
ofjury deliberations. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell UsAbout How
Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 1,7-8 (1997) (noting the differences
between live trials and mock jury studies but explaining that the real issue is whether such
differences affect generalizability of the study results). In many cases, however, the results of
experimental research and studies involving real juror interviews coincide. See Neil Vidmar &
Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1166-67(2001)
(noting that "the experimental research related to juries and experts produces conclusions
consistent with the studies involving juror interviews" and concluding that jurors "generally
make reasonable use of complex material, utilizing the expert testimony when it is presented in
a form that they can use"). In the polarization studies, the mock jurors were interviewed about
their initial determinations, deliberated, and reached a consensus that tended to be more extreme
than the initial interviews suggested. See Kerr et al., supra note 89, at 705 (describing mock
juror studies showing a polarization effect in whichjurors were exposed to evidence, deliberated
in twelve-personjuries and provided postdeliberation guiltjudgments); BROWN, supra note 127,
at 227-29 (citing studies). For an article contending that even computers experience group
polarization when "fed with the same noisy input and confronted with the same environmental
distributions," see Klaus Fiedler, Explaining and Simulating Judgment Biases as an
Aggregation Phenomenon in Probabilistic, Multiple-Cue Environments, 103 PSYCHOL. REV.
193,198-99, 211 (1996) (discussing group polarization as resulting "from aggregation alone
whenever one of two opposite attitudes is dominant," a finding "consistent with the repeated
empirical finding that polarization occurs only after unconstrained, extended discussion").
145. See BROWN, supra note 127, at 227-29 (collecting studies). Very diverse groups
tend to diminish this effect. See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 116 (citing James Fishkin's
experiments demonstrating an absence of polarization effects in groups composed of highly
diverse individuals). Although juries generally are diverse in many respects, capital juries are
not heterogeneous: in order to serve on the jury, jurors must be willing to support the death
penalty (in the appropriate case, as the voir dire usually instructs juries). Counter-intuitively,
it might be less polarizing to have a diversity of opinions about the legitimacy of the death
penalty. See Devine et al., supra note 50, at 693 (citing evidence from the Capital Jury Project
that capital juries tend to polarize toward death rather than life, seemingly contradicting the
strong leniency bias observed in mock jury studies).
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justified by increased accuracy.'46 Instead, group members frequently fail to
respond to the information presented. 1
47
In sum, the dilution effect together with the dynamics of group
decisionmaking bear on why the Barefoot court "8 was mistaken that the jury
deliberation is the right phase of the proceeding to sort out good science from
bad. The jury's sentencing determination is unanimous, a group decision
reached after deliberation, based on ideals of deliberative democracy that
argument and reflection among competing views will lead to better-more
accurate-outcomes. ' Such decisions may get hopelessly mired by irrelevant
information, skewed by initial tendencies (toward overweighting medical at
the expense of other scientific expertise, for example, or in death penalty
juries, towards the expert who agrees with death-qualified juries'
preconceptions), and stymied by the exertion of an unfamiliar cognitive task
(evaluating scientific testimony) for which they have no training and no
guidance.
III. AN EXAMPLE OF GATEKEEEPING FAILURE: CAPITAL SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS
The argument in favor of judicial scrutiny might appear to be mere
academic meandering in light ofDaubert's insistence onj udicial gatekeeping.
146. See Heath & Gonzalez, supra note 117, at 306 (arguing that interaction does not
cause people to assess the available information differently but merely to develop more coherent
rationales for their choices and beliefs). Heath and Gonzalez studied interactive
decisionmaking-individual decisions made after consultation with the group-and distinguished
it from group decisionmaking on the basis that groups must reach a consensus and the
"aggregation procedure may hide or distort changes in individual preferences." Id. at 307. Jury
decisionmaking has facets of both interactive and group decisionmaking; although the end
product must be a consensual decision, in order to avoid a hung jury, each juror must
individually agree and each can hold out until persuaded. Moreover, Heath and Gonzalez
conclude that consensus decisionmaking is not the only kind of group decision that exhibits the
characteristics ofgroupthink. See id. at 323. The characteristics ofgroupthink, "'discount[ing]
warnings and other forms of negative feedback that, taken seriously, might lead the group
members to reconsider their assumptions'. . . provide[s] a remarkably satisfying description of
the phenomenon ... of individual decision makers interacting in a social environment." Id.
(quoting Irving J. Janis, Groupthink, 5 PSYCHOL. TODAY 43, 44 (1971)).
147. See id. at 305.
148. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (refusing to exclude future
dangerousness testimony as a constitutional matter because the defense could not show that
"psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time").
149. See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 73-74 (noting the perceived view that group
deliberation yields an outcome that takes everyone's position into account, and contending that,
on the contrary, people deliberating in groups tend to polarize their positions from that of any
individual member).
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Judges already screen for scientific validity, at least in theory. In one
important context, however, gatekeeping is tossed to the winds. Ironically,
both state and federal courts are lackadaisical about gatekeeping when it
comes to capital sentencing. 5 0 Elsewhere, I have argued that this gatekeeping
failure is constitutionally impermissible.' 5' Although the sentencing process
has even greater potential to be infected with some of the biases described
above, the Federal Rules of Evidence-which include the Daubert standard for
expert witnesses-generally do not apply at federal capital sentencing
proceedings,' despite the Supreme Court's recognition that capital
sentencing requires a "heightened reliability" standard.' 53 Nonetheless, by
statute, only relevant evidence may be admitted'54 and, as under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, if the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative
value, even relevant evidence may be excluded.155 Thus, even if the federal
rules do not apply directly, some scientific validity inquiry ought to be
applied.
Capital sentencing is by a jury.'56 A common justification for declining
to apply the rules of evidence strictly at sentencing is that such proceedings
150. The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 significantly expanded the scope of federal
capital crimes. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See Charles
Kenneth Eldred, The New Federal Death Penalties, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 296-98 (1994)
(listing 60 capital offenses). But see Benjamin Weiser, Manhattan Judge Finds Federal Death
Law Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002 at BI (citing opinion by Judge Jed Rakoff,
ruling federal death penalty law unconstitutional). Even in federal cases, however, Daubert is
generally not invoked at sentencing, because the rules of evidence do not apply. See, e.g., U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (1997) ("In resolving any dispute concerning a
factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information
without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial."); ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-45(d) (1994) (providing that "[a]ny evidence which has probative value and is relevant
to sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence").
151. See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future
Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353 (2003).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) ("Information is admissible regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials.").
153. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(j). See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411(1986)
(setting a "heightened reliability" standard for capital sentencing).
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) ("[l]nformation may be presented as to any matter relevant
to the sentence.").
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 3393(a) (analogous to FED. R. EVID. 403).
156. In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that the capital sentencing decision
must be made by ajury. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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have become a search for justice rather than truth.'57 Putting aside the
question of whether they are really separable, justice, in any event, ought to
include the search for truth. Rationality and the quest for accuracy, in the
context of what is an unabashedly adversarial proceeding, demands that there
be some control over what count as facts in the proceeding. The importance
of a structured reasoning process for rationality argues for judicial screening
of expert testimony.
Expert testimony is prevalent at capital sentencing hearings. ' In Texas,
for example, experts routinely base their testimony entirely on the defendant's
conduct at trial and the facts of the crime to opine to future dangerousness
with one-hundred-percent accuracy. 59 One Texas expert, Dr. Griffith, was
"frequently the state's star witness" and had never once testified that any
defendant did not pose a future danger. 6 Judge Garza observed that it is still
as true today as it was in Barefoot's time that "[n]either the Court nor the
State of Texas has cited a single reputable scientific source contradicting the
unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field that psychiatric predictions
of long-term future violence are wrong more often than they are right."'16'
Without formal requirements of evidentiary rules, there is virtually no
structured examination of the scientific basis for such testimony. Absent such
a structured examination, the jury has little hope of accurately assessing the
alternatives or of making an optimal decision. Irrelevant information may
result in poor decisions from the dilution effect. Group polarization may skew
the jury's decision in the direction of any initial tendency. The
representativeness and overconfidence heuristics are particularly troubling in
this regard. For example, the representativeness heuristic may cause the
individual jurors to base decisions on the extent to which a particular event (or
157. The Supreme Court has held that evidentiary standards in the sentencing phase are
fairly open because "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense [ought to be available to support] a sentence less than death."
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
158. Expert testimony is frequently proffered at capital sentencing proceedings. For
example, in the Capital Jury Project, funded by the National Science Foundation, the California
portion of the study examined thirty-six death penalty cases, and found that the prosecution
called an expert in eighty-one percent of the cases, and the defense called an expert in ninety
percent. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1997) (noting that
"conventional practice at the penalty phase involves presenting an expert to the jury at some
point-in many cases more than one-who will testify based upon an expertise gained through
training and study.").
159. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring).
161. Flores, 210 F.3d at 462 (Garza, J., concurring) (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 921
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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person) resembles a certain category of events (or fits within their stereotypes
of people).'62 If people share a particular bias, polarization may magnify this
tendency. Thus, in assessing the probability of future violent behavior for a
particular defendant, jurors are likely to think that one violent incident is
representative of a pattern, since they are unlikely to know, much less refer to,
the probabilities of a recurring incident.'63 In addition, because people
frequently overestimate the relevance of memorable incidents at the expense
of statistical base rates 64 and make judgments on the basis of what they
remember, 65 the jury may share a skewed perception that violent recidivism
is common. 66 A shared perception that violent recidivism is common may
make the jurors more likely to opt for the death sentence. 67 Judges may be
equally swayed by media reports, but group polarization may magnify this
initial tendency of individual jurors.
In addition, because the jury has recently heard in graphic detail how the
defendant committed one atrociously violent act, they are likely to believe that
it is representative of the way the defendant will behave in the future. The
162. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 92, at 431 (defining the representativeness
heuristic as evaluating "the probability of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to
which it is: (i) similar in essential properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient
features of the process by which it is generated" so that a characteristic is matched to a category
and the probability evaluated in terms of the closeness of the match). The classic study on this
bias was that of Meehl and Rosen, who documented the degree that psychiatric diagnoses made
in staffmeetings ignored population base rates. See Paul E. Meehl & Albert Rosen, Antecedent
Probability and the Efficiency ofPsychometric Signs, Patterns, or CuttingScores, 52 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 194 (1955). A simple example is that "a politician of erect bearing walking briskly to the
podium is likely to be seen as strong and decisive; this is an example of judgment by
representativeness." Kahneman & Tversky, Reality, supra note 94, at 582.
163. See Dawes, supra note 40, at 532 (explaining the fallacy of "considering the
probability of the evidence given the hypothesis ... without looking at... the prior odds").
164. See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note 94, at 163. This is known as
the availability heuristic. See id.
165. "For example, a judgment of the prevalence of suicide in a community is likely to
be mediated by the ease with which instances come to mind; this is an example of the
availability heuristic." Kahneman & Tversky, Reality, supra note 94, at 582.
166. The number ofdramatic deaths, for example, were greatly overestimated by medical
student and physician participants in a study that asked participants to estimate the number of
deaths due to each of forty-two diseases. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski et al., Effects of
Expertise and Experience on Risk Judgments, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 278 (1983).
167. Interviews with capital jurors, for example, found that jurors overwhelmingly
underestimated the amount of time a defendant would have to serve before becoming eligible
for parole, relying primarily on memory of vivid media accounts of violent recidivism. See
William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of
False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 671-72 (1999)
(discussing the interviews of 916 capital jurors in the Capital Juror Project).
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representativeness heuristic suggests that jurors do not refer to base rates (of
which they are usually ignorant in any event) in their decision making process.
The anchoring heuristic suggests that because thejurors first learned about the
defendant in the context of a graphically violent crime, they are likely to
persist in thinking of the defendant as violent, even in the face of contrary
evidence. 6 ' People frequently arrive at a decision that varies according to
their starting point. 6 9 The availability heuristic, which is the tendency of
people to confuse the facility with which they can recall an event with its
likelihood of recurrence, 70 suggests that the jurors' vivid recollection of a
horrendous crime the defendant committed will be confused with future
propensities for violence. The overconfidence bias similarly may have
unforeseen consequences in the context of capital sentencing.
The jury has already decided that the defendant is a very dangerous
person when it found the defendant guilty, and the overconfidence bias will
tend to make them be more confident in their action-a guilty verdict-than the
facts would suggest. Any information that supports their decision is likely to
have a disproportionate impact on their sentencing decision, due to the related
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance.' 7' This appears to be what happens in
capital sentencing: capital jurors overwhelmingly focus on the question of
guilt even after the verdict has been rendered and they are supposed to be
focusing on the separate question of the appropriate punishment.
72
Overconfidence and cognitive dissonance suggest that jurors may be
overconfident in their decision of guilt and subsequently overvalue the expert
168. Anchoring is the tendency for arbitrary starting points to influence decisions. See
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
Sci. 1124,1128-29 (1974).
169. For example, when asked to estimate percentages of United Nations countries that
are African after being exposed to the result of a roulette wheel-an obviously random and
irrelevant value-people responded with marked differences according to the value spun on the
wheel (the median answer of people for whom the value on the wheel was 10 was considerably
lower than that for people exposed to a wheel value of 65). See id. This seemingly irrational
behavior is explained by cognitive psychologists as the anchoring effect, in which decisions are
made according to some (perhaps irrelevant) starting value.
170. See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note 94, at 163 (describing the
availability heuristic and the cognitive biases that may result).
171. Cognitive dissonance is a phenomenon in which people will adjust their attitudes
and beliefs in order to justify a previously undertaken decision or course of action. See
FESTINGER, supra note 108.
172. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1011, 1017-19 (2001) (describing the capital juror project and its findings that jurors continue
to focus on guilt after the verdict and that they appear to ignore, discredit and devalue mitigating
evidence even when it appears to be extensive and credible).
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prediction that confirms their decision, giving disproportionate weight to any
information that confirms their initial decision of guilt.'73 This is another
reason to exclude testimony unsupported by data, such as when an expert
testifies with more certainty than is warranted (i.e., the statement that he can
be "one-hundred percent certain" that the defendant will kill again).
CONCLUSION
There are a number of reasons that judicial gatekeeping-screening for
accuracy before permitting expert testimony-makes for more accurate
judgments. 74 As Robert Burns explains, the question that should be asked
with regard to admissibility, is whether the evidence at issue would throw the
jury "off track" in its goal of reaching the public truth.'75 The dilution effect
explains the importance of screening irrelevant information from jury
decisionmaking. People participating in experiments expect that information
given to them for the purpose of making a decision is relevant.'76 Similarly,
jurors, who already participated in the guilt phase of the trial, have
experiencedjudicial screening, and may expect that whatever information they
are given is relevant to their task.'77 When it is not, the decision will be less
accurate than had such evidence been excluded.
Judges, however, are aware that they are hearing both relevant and
irrelevant information, and they are accountable to their reviewing courts.
The dilution effect disappears when people are made accountable for their
judgment-as judges are by judicial review-as long as the decisionmaker
173. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Casefor MotivatedReasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480
(1990) (observing that people will often construct theories and use evidence in ways that make
their final inferences come out the way they want them to).
174. As discussed earlier in this article, to call something an "accurate" judgment is a
normative statement that raises complex issues about what we know, how we know it and what
our goals are. In the context of the goals of a capitol juror, the jury appears to focus on the goal
of determining whether this defendant would kill again if released. Interviews with capitol
jurors reflect this overwhelming concern. See generally Bowers & Steiner, supra note 167
(discussing the Capital Juror Project). The arguments of lawyers and legal scholars that the
question ought to be whether the defendant will pose a threat to other inmates or prison
personnel are beside the point. My point is simply that in light of their goal, the presentation
of irrelevant, unscientific, expert testimony makes their determination less accurate.
175. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999).
176. See generally Tetlock et al., supra note 80.
177. For example, Tetlock and his co-authors found that even when test participants were
told that the information was randomly generated from a computer, and contained both relevant
and irrelevant information, they still made more regressive estimates given the irrelevant
information. See id. at 926.
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knows that both relevant and irrelevant information are being presented.'
Even when you tell unaccountable individuals (and jurors are unaccountable
because they never need to explain the reason for their decision)' 79 that they
are receiving both relevant and irrelevant information and that they need to
sort through it to reach their decision, the dilution effect occurs. 0 Irrelevant
and inaccurate information throws group decisions off track even more than
it does individual judgment. Thus, the dilution effect suggests that merely
presenting evidence that counters the misinformation may not be enough.
Moreover, judges are experts, in the sense that they make repeat
decisions, in the presence of feedback. People who repeat the decision
making-process many times in the presence of feedback regarding their
accuracy (as judges do because of the appellate process) are more likely to
make accuratejudgments.'' Judges get more feedback thanjuries through the
appellate process, and through legal scholarship and commentary. Expertise
tends to decrease both technical errors and the consideration of irrelevant
information. 2 Experts-such as judges-trained in decision rules (such as the
analysis required under Daubert) tend to make betterjudgments about validity
than laypeople-jurors-who are unaware of these rules."' Training can
improve reasoning.8 4 Judges, who have extensive training in legal analysis
and, post-Daubert, in reasoning about expert testimony, can be expected to
make better evaluations of such testimony than untrained jurors. In addition,
178. See id. at 930-31 (demonstrating that "the dilution effect disappears among
accountable subjects who were explicitly told that conversational norms did not apply because
the information they had been given had been randomly selected from a computer
database ... [or] when conversational norms were explicitly deactivated").
179. Even if one assumed thatjurors were accountable, in the sense that they must render
a public decision, and may have to explain their reasons to friends and family, it is only the
accountability to unknown audiences that appears to affect the care with which information is
scrutinized. See Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 13, at 388 (defining accountability).
180. See Tetlock et al., supra note 80, at 931 (demonstrating that "explicitly deactivating
conversational norms was not sufficient to eliminate the dilution effect among unaccountable
subjects").
181. Rachlinski gives the example of reinsurers. See Rachlinski, supra note 53, at 739.
182. See Seidenfeld, supra note 64, at 499.
183. See Lemer & Tetlock, supra note 67, at 263 (explaining that accountability, which
may attenuate biases resulting from lack of effort or self-critical awareness, has no effect on
judgment tasks requiring knowledge of formal decision rules that are unfamiliar to the
decisionmaker).
184. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 1119 (citing studies showing the effect of training
on increasing the accuracy of decisionmaking).
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although the overconfidence bias may afflict experts more than novices,"'
groups are more prone to it than individuals. 1
8 6
Further, accountability can significantly improve the quality of some
kinds ofjudgment."'7 Individual judgments under conditions of accountability
are more likely to be careful and thoughtful than group judgments without
individual accountability.' s Judges are accountable not only to their superior
courts, but also to a wider audience of legal scholars and practitioners who
will comment on their decision. Accountability to an unknown audience
enhances careful decisionmaking.'" 9 People who know that they will have to
justify their decisions ahead of time, as judges do, perform better
cognitively.' 9' Moreover, when the accountability review evaluates the
process resulting in the judgment rather than the outcome, such process
judgments are improved under conditions of accountability.' The
185. See Seidenfeld, supra note 64, at 498 (noting that overconfidence in their
predictions is a "bias to which experts may be more prone than novices").
186. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the
Groupthink Model, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 403, 419 (1992) (noting that
"groupthink promoted rigid and self-righteous patterns of thinking").
187. See Taylor, supra note 78, at 76 ("Accountability for one's inferences produces
more thorough and more elaborate processing that takes account of more information and that
is, at least sometimes, more accurate than processing that occurs in the absence of
accountability"). Because the conditions ofjudicial gatekeeping review are precisely those that
increase accuracy, it is the judge who should be the locus of the decision about admissibility of
expert testimony, rather than the jury. Cf Seidenfeld, supra note 64, at 509 (explaining that
judicial review of agency decisionmaking falls within the definition of accountability because
courts examine the arguments pertaining to the validity of agency reasoning). Like judicial
review of agency decisions,j udicial review ofgatekeeping determinations similarly examine the
basis on which the determination was made.
188, See Bettenhausen, supra note 77, at 361 (citing studies demonstrating that people
in groups of sixteen who shared responsibility for the judgment task "used less complex
judgement [sic] strategies than subjects working alone" although "multiplejudges who expected
to justify their judgments worked as hard as individual judges").
189. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 67, at 256 (explaining that "people often seek
approval from their respective audience" and that if"audience views are known prior to forming
one's own opinion, conformity becomes the likely coping strategy" and the result is likely to
decrease rather than increase accuracy as it does when the audience is unknown).
190. See id. (noting that while post-decisional accountability leads to self-justification
rather than self-criticism and thus poor decision performance, people that know they will be
held accountable before engaging in the judgment task tend to be highly self-critical and more
accurate).
191. See id. at 258 (citing studies showing that "accountability for decision
outcomes-rather than decision processes-would increase the escalation ofcommitment to prior
courses of action .... [while] [p]rocess accountability, by contrast, would (a) lead decision
makers to engage in more evenhanded evaluation of alternatives and (b) decrease the need for
self-justification").
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gatekeeping decision of thejudge is reviewable primarily for its process rather
than its outcome, 192 so one would expect a more careful and critical evaluation
of the evidence than could be expected from jurors, who at most may have
some outcome accountability in terms of possible negative consequences from
their community.
Daubert is unequivocal that relevance in the context of expert testimony
means scientific validity. 93 Relevance is not "merely" a matter of evidentiary
rules, it is a constitutional minimum, a requirement of due process and a
fundamental fairness requirement of the rule of law. Contrary to the Court's
contention in Barefoot,'94 the adversary process cannot be trusted "to sort out
the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future
dangerousness."'' 9s Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Daubert, the
requirement that expert testimony be helpful to the jury, "supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known", is a
condition of relevance.' 9 This is the task of the judge, and the rule of law
emphasis on rationality underscores why this should be so.
192. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993).
193. See Daubert, 569 U.S. at 591.
194. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 (1983).
195. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.
196. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
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